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PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE TO
INDIGENTS: FAILURES AT THE LOCAL
LEVEL IN LIGHT OF DECREASED
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
JOANNE HURD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care for indigent' residents of decaying urban centers, al-
ready in short supply, is becoming increasingly inaccessible.2 Many
inner-city public hospitals have either eliminated services3 or relo-
* B.A. Emory University, 1980; J.D., Washington University, 1984
1. "Indigent" and "poor," as used in this Note, refer to persons not carrying pri-
vate health insurance and unable to pay for health care from personal assets. The
Hill-Burton Act, discussed infra at notes 109-32 and accompanying text, requires par-
ticipating hospitals to provide care for persons unable to pay for services, including
those that are "otherwise self-supporting but unable to pay the full charge for needed
[medical] services." 42 C.F.R. § 53.11 I(g)(1) (1984). Medicaid and Medicare, dis-
cussed mfra at notes 133-65 and accompanying text, allows states to establish recipient
qualifications with regard to income levels. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396p (1982).
2. See, e.g., Hermann, The Poor- Their Medical Needs and the Health Services
Avadlable to Them, 399 ANNALS 12 (1972); Levison, The Challenge of Hospital Services
for the Poor, 399 ANNALS 22 (1972).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 858 (W.D. Tex.
1980) (challenge to closure of the last remaining inpatient service); NAACP v. Wil-
mington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919, 922 nn. I & 2 (D. Del. 1977) [herein-
after cited as Wilmington I] (challenge to proposed closing of 75% of current bed
capacity at urban facility), afd, 584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1978).
Urban public hospitals provide important services both to indigents and to society
at large. For indigents, these hospitals serve as a surrogate family physician, with out-
patient services comprising the bulk of total patient care programs. Urban public
hospital emergency rooms handle twice the number of cases handled by suburban
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cated to suburban areas.4 Thus, the poor, the elderly, and racial mi-
norities that now constitute a large percentage of the urban
population' must seek medical care from private resources. 6 At the
hospitals. Even though urban public facilities represent less than 2% of all commu-
nity hospitals, they provide 20% of all hospital medical training. Goff, The Plight of
the Urban Hospital, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 657, 658 (1980).
Unfortunately, many urban hospitals are "antiquated, overcrowded, dangerous,
and in a degrading state." S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7842, 7879. Congress, therefore, listed mod-
ernization of dilapidated urban hospitals as a prime concern in the National Health
Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225
(codified and amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 12-102. One survey of 17 major American
cities showed that between 1937 and 1977, in one-half of all cities studied, one-third
of all urban hospitals either closed or relocated. The survey included the cities of
Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus (Ohio), De-
troit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Milwaukee, New York (Bronx and Brooklyn), New-
ark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C. Note, Maintaining
Health Care in the Inner City: Title V1 and Hospital Relocations, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
271, 274 n.19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Maintaining Health Care].
See generally Friedman, The End of the Line: When a Hospital Closes, 52 HosPi-
TALS 69, 74 (1978) (discussing inadequate hospital facilities in some areas); Note,
Maladjusted Health Care Services: Restructuring the Current Regulatory System, 6
AM. J. L. & MED. 407 (1980).
5. This demographic phenomenon is the result of the exodus from inner cities of
middle-class Americans, industries, and jobs. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HEALTH UNITED STATES 5-7 (1979) (inner city racial
minorities are impoverished disproportionately); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1977) (ra-
cial minorities are a large percentage of urban population); Levin, Neighborhood De-
velopment and the Displacement of the Elderly, 18 URBAN L. ANN. 223, 228 n.9 (1980)
(the majority of elderly Americans live in urban areas), citing R. STRUYK, THE HoUs-
ING SITUATION OF ELDERLY AMERICANS 7, Table 1 (1976).
The poor, the elderly, and racial minorities often have greater health needs. See,
e.g., Lang, Poor Woman andHealth Care, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1056 (1981) (cit-
ing studies that show that women need more health care than men; poor women rely
on emergency rooms and out-patient clinics for this care; nonwhite women are exper-
iencing an increasingly higher rate of cervical cancer; and infant mortality rates are
increasing among blacks); U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
HEALTH UNITED STATES 1979 73 (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, HEALTH STATUS OF MINORITIES AND Low-INCOME GROUPS 11-12 (1979)
(greater reliance on out-patient clinics and emergency rooms among non-whites than
whites); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HEALTH DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN
WHITE AND NONWHITE AMERICANS xi (1977) (nonwhites have a 70% higher infant
mortality rate).
6. The private health care resources on which this Note focuses are non-public
facilities, not private health practitioners. This Note does not address fees and serv-
ices of health care personnel, such as doctors.
For a discussion of how the flight of doctors and middle-class patients to the sub-
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same time, federal and state governments are reducing drastically fi-
nancial assistance to private health care providers for their services to
the poor.7 To compensate, some private hospitals have attempted to
limit free or government-reimbursed care to the poor-with alarming
results.8
This Note discusses local, state, and federal attempts to provide
indigent city-dwellers with access to adequate health care. It also dis-
cusses the framework through which an aggrieved health care seeker
might obtain legal redress. The Note addresses legal challenges
aimed at local decisions to close or relocate urban public hospitals.9
It next examines developments in the federal mechanism of provid-
ing health care assistance to the states. 10 The Note concludes with a
summary of the present status and future outlook of indigent health
care in light of the current administration's federal funding
cutbacks. "
II. CHALLENGING THE RELOCATION OR CLOSURE OF INNER-CITY
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
A. Challenges Under Title VI
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 196412 to bolster the
Supreme Court's ruling that the fourteenth amendment' 3 forbids
"separate but equal" treatment of the races by states. 14 In Title VI' 5
urbs has inspired many of the hospital relocation decisions, see HEW Hospital Site
Location Study, reprinted in Brief for Appellants at xxx-xxxi, NAACP v. Wilmington
Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Wilmington
111] on remand, 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980), af'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 103-65 for discussion of federal and state
assistance schemes. See infra note 143 and accompanying text for an overview of
federal cutbacks.
8. See, e.g., Heires, Expectant Mother TurnedAwayfrom Hospital, Belleville News
Democrat, Feb. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (private, suburban hospital's policy denies treat-
mert to indigent patients that reside outside the township because the hospital feared
it was exceeding its state-allotted limit for Medicaid reimbursement).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 12-102.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 103-65.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 166-71.
12. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. Section one provides that a state shall not
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." Id. § I.
Section five grants Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." Id § 5.
14. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also H.R. REP. No.
1984]
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of the Act, Congress ordered the denial or termination of federal
funds to programs 6 that practiced racial discrimination. 7 Title VI
authorizes federal administrative agencies such as the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)' 8 to promulgate regulations to
implement its provisions.9 The rules and conduct of these agencies
are subject to judicial review.20
Virtually all hospitals receive some federal funding through the
Hill-Burton Act,2 ' which provides construction assistance,22 or the
Social Security Act. 23 Thus, plaintiffs have chosen Title VI as their
weapon for challenging the constitutionality of hospital closures or
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963), for the broad congressional purpose behind the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1982). See generally Dunn, Title VI, The Guide-
lines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 42-45 (1967); Com-
ment, Title VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and himpact, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 824, 887-970 (1968) (discussing Title VI).
16. Section 601 of Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
17. Id. § 2000d-l. Because Title VI sets forth conditions for Congress' disbursal
of tax revenues for the general welfare, Congress enacted Title VI under the auspices
of Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution, not § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See 1I
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1019 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970); Note, The
Prima Fadie Case and Remedies in Title VI1 Hospital Relocation Cases, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 689, 696 n.30 (1980).
18. Until 1980, HHS existed as the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW). For the sake of clarity and consistency, this Note shall hereinafter refer
only to HHS.
19. See42 U.S.C. §2000d-I (1982).
20. Id. § 2000d-2. This provision does not explicitly grant a private cause of ac-
tion to individuals desiring to challenge alleged violations of Title VI. Many courts,
however, have inferred this right. See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982).
22. See infra notes 109-32 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
Hill-Burton construction grant scheme.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1982). Most hospitals participate in the Medicare
program. See, e.g., Rose, Challenging the Relocation and Closure of Inner. City Hospi-
tals-Analysis Methodologies and Limitations, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 102, 105
(1982). Under the Medicare program, the federal government provides funding to
states for reimbursing hospitals that treat the elderly. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395qq
(1982). Title VI applies to this type of indirect assistance. Id. § 2000d. Title VI re-
quirements apply even when the recipient program receives no net financial gain from
federal reimbursement. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 n.21
(D.S.C. 1974), aff'dper curiam, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
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relocations resulting in disparate health care services to minorities.24
HHS regulations25 promulgated under Title VI prohibit recipients of
federal funding from making site selections that have discriminatory
effects.2" Therefore, plaintiffs have asserted that the relocation of
hospital services to predominately white suburbs violates Title VI.
Plaintiffs must overcome three major obstacles before they can pre-
vail on a Title VI challenge. First, they must convince courts to rec-
ognize a private right of action under Title VI. Second, they must
persuade courts that they need not exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit. Finally, in the absence of evidence of racial animus
they must convince courts that proof of a disparate racial impact suf-
fices to establish a prima facie case under Title VI.
1. Private Right of Action Under Title VI
Title VI requires the HHS Office of Civil Rights to investigate indi-
vidual plaintiffs' complaints.27 The Act fails to specify, however,
whether groups or individuals may bring a private cause of action
under Title VI in federal court.28 The United States Supreme Court
has not ruled directly on this question, but in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,29 the Court assumed that a private cause of action does exist
under Title VI.3 The Cannon Court announced that a private cause
of action for sex discrimination could be implied under Title IX of
the Education Admendments of 19723' because Congress intended
Title IX to track Title VI.3 2 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
discussed at length the purposes behind Title VI that command the
inference of a private cause of action.33
24. See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 18.
26. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3) (1984). Administrative regulations are legislative
rather than interpretive when Congress has delegated its legislative power to an
agency. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979); General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of
Interpretive Rules and General Statements of Polic, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047, 1047-49 (1976).
27. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.7 (1984).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1982).
29. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
30. Id. at 694-96.
31. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
32. 441 U.S. at 694-96.
33. Id. at 704 n.36.
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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,34 Justice Ste-
vens, joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist, suggested
that enforcement of the "personal federal rights" embodied in Title
VI would be hampered severely if private individuals could not sue
under the Act.35 Lower federal courts, including the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, in a hospital closure case,36 have supported the
inference of a private right of action under Title VI. 37
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Although most courts addressing the issue agree that Title VI af-
fords a private right of action, it remains unclear whether an ag-
grieved party must first exhaust all available administrative
remedies.38 While Title VI clearly provides administrative remedies,
the Act does not explicitly require exhaustion of these remedies
before seeking judicial resolution. 39 Lower federal courts are split
over this issue in hospital relocation cases.40 The Cannon Court's
34. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
35. Id at 419-20 (concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justices Powell, Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Blackmun found it unnecessary to resolve the question of a pri-
vate cause of action under Title VI because the question was not litigated below.
They assumed a private right of action to exist only for the purposes of this case. Id.
at 283-84 (Powell, J., announcing the opinion of the Court); Id. at 328 (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). Justice White did not
join this portion of Justice Brennan's dissent because he believes that no private right
of action exists under Title VI. Id. at 328 n.8.
See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (setting forth four relevant factors for
determining whether a private right of action is implicit in a statute).
36. See Wilmington 11I, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
37. See Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256,
1264 (D. Conn. 1979); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273,
1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affid in part and vacated in part, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980),
af'd, 463 U.S. 82 (1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983); Blackshear Residents
Org. v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146, 1150 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (by implica-
tion); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (E.D.
Va. 1972) (by implication); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 583-
84 (N.D. Ill. 1967). But see Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321, 323
(E.D. Va. 1979).
38. Lower courts have required plaintiffs seeking termination of funds to go first
through administrative channels. See, e.g., Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605
(2d Cir. 1978); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
40. See Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (refusing to enjoin
a St. Louis hospital closure until HHS first investigates the complaint), afid, 620 F.2d
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presumption of a private right of action may overrule implicitly those
lower court decisions requiring exhaustion.4 Nevertheless, some
courts have suggested that the administrative agencies have more ex-
pertise in these matters and, therefore, have "primary jurisdiction."42
HHS generally leaves cases of Title VI violations against individuals
to the courts, reserving its limited enforcement capabilities to com-
plaints of systematic discrimination.4"
3. Appropriate Legal Standard for Proving a Violation of Title
VI: Discriminatory Intent vs. Disparate Impact
In fourteenth amendment equal protection challenges based on ra-
cial discrimination, plaintiffs must prove that a racially discrimina-
tory purpose motivated the challenged conduct before the courts will
evaluate the conduct under "strict scrutiny" analysis.' Neither dis-
criminatory impact itself,45 nor the foreseeability of such impact nec-
essarily supports a conclusion of discriminatory intent.46
Proof that racial animus motivated a public hospital's closure or
relocation clearly would support a Title VI challenge.47 This evi-
680 (8th Cir. 1980); Wilmington L 426 F. Supp. at 924-25 (plaintiffs were required to
exhaust administrative remedies unless HHS "could not or wouldnot" act on plain-
tiffs' complaint), af'd, 584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1978). But see Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d
612, 620 (2d Cir. 1980) (exhaustion of administrativc remedy not required); United
States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 860 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (no exhaustion
required).
41. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 620 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Cannon to support
the lack of an exhaustion requirement). See also Wilmington 111, 599 F.2d at 1250
n. 10 (holding that a private right of action exists under Title VI and that plaintiffs
need not first exhaust administrative remedies to assert a claim).
42. See Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 904 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Wilmington I,
426 F. Supp. at 924. See generally Rose, supra note 23, at 106.
43. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 (1979). See also
Note, Maintaining Health Care, supra note 4, at 280 n.48.
44. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976). When courts invoke
strict scrutiny analysis to decide the constitutionality of state action, they nearly al-
ways hold that the state action violates the equal protection clause. See Gunther,
Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
45. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Bryan v. Koch,
492 F. Supp. 212, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a f'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. See, e.g., Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979)
(foresecability of adverse impact is a proper consideration but in itself insufficient to
show discriminatory purpose).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
1984]
Washington University Open Scholarship
302 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 27:295
dence is usually difficult to obtain because hospital board members
or city officials rarely allow racial remarks to be recorded for public
scrutiny.48 In Bryan v. KOCh,4 9 a recent case challenging the closure
of a New York City public hospital, the plaintiffs offered data con-
cerning the closure's potential impact on minorities as well as the
city's failure to provide alternative access to health care. The district
court flatly refused to accept this as evidence proving racial animus.50
Like the fourteenth amendment, Title VI fails to define explicitly
the scope of its proscription of discriminatory conduct by federally
funded institutions.5 Strong evidence, however, supports inferring a
discriminatory impact standard rather than the more exacting dis-
criminatory intent standard. First, HHS regulations promulgated
under Title VI clearly forbid federally funded programs from making
site selections that will have a discriminatory effect.5" Second, legis-
48. See Rose, supra note 23, at 109 n.85 (author suggests examination of minutes
and documents produced by hospital board members for evidence of racial motive).
49. 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afid, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
50. Id at 219, 223 (discriminatory intent is not shown by evidence that travel to
alternative facilities is unduly difficult). See also NAACP v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 313 n.181 (D. Del. 1980) (on remand from Wilmington
11I, court held isolated racist statements by board of directors was insufficient evi-
dence of discriminatory intent), a7'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). See supra note 16 for text of the Act. Agency
regulations promulgated under Title VI also broadly prohibit all forms of unequal
access to federal program benefits. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.3 (1984) (Agriculture
Dep't); 13 C.F.R. §§ 112.3-.7 (1984) (SBA); 15 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1984) (Commerce Dep't);
45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1984) (HHS); 45 C.F.R. § 1010.10 (1984) (O.E.O.). A 1970 Report
of the United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded that despite the lack of
statutory guidance on the meaning of the term "discrimination," agency regulations
uniformly have spelled out specific practices that fall within the meaning of the term
and are thereby prohibited. These include the following: Any difference in quality,
quantity, or the manner in which the benefit is provided; standards or requirements
for participation that have as their purpose or that have the effect of excluding mem-
bers of certain racial or ethnic minorities; construction of a facility in a location with
the purpose or effect of excluding individuals from the benefits of any program on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 559-60 (1970).
52. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3) (1984) (as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1982))
provides:
In determining the site or location of a facilties [sic], an applicant or recipient
may not make selections with the effect of excluding individuals from, denying
them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any programs to
which this regulation applies, on the ground of race, color, or national origin; or
with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplish-
ment of the objectives of the Act or this regulation.
Id.
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lative debate prior to Title VI's enactment indicates the congressional
intent to avoid sponsoring any activity resulting in racial
discrimination. 3
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on a hospital
closure challenge under Title VI, recent holdings indicate the Court's
movement towards adopting the discriminatory impact standard for
Title VI violations. In 1974, the Supreme Court, in Lau v. Nichols,
54
held that a school board's failure to establish a remedial language
program had a discriminatory effect on non-English speaking stu-
dents." The Court unanimously declared this disparate impact a vi-
olation of Title VI, even without a showing of purposeful
discrimination.56 In its rationale, the Court stressed both the reme-
dial purpose of the Civil Rights Act as expressed in HHS guidelines57
53. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13,334 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) ("This is the
reason why we have Title VI in this bill, to protect the taxpayers' money, to make sure
that here in America, where we collect taxes from all our people, we spend this money
for the benefit of all of our people."). See generally Civil Rights-The President's Pro-
gram, 1963: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1963); Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
Remarks of the President and the United States Attorney General during the de-
bate over Title VI also support use of a disparate impact standard. During hearings
before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy stated:
Title VI deals with a related problem [to that confronted by Title VII]. Many
programs and activities carried on by State and local governmental authorities
and by private enterprises receive financial assistance or backing from the Fed-
eral Government. The benefits of such programs and activities unquestionably
should be available to eligible recipients without regard to race or color.
Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the
Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcommt. No. 5 of the House Comrnr on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1381 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 House Hear-
ings)]. President Kennedy stated: "Simple justice requires that public funds, to which
all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages,
entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimination." President's Message on
Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, June 19, 1963, reprinted in 1963 House Hearings,
supra, at 1454.
54. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
55. Id. at 568.
56. Id at 569.
57. Id. at 567 (citing HHS guidelines that stipulate that recipients of federal aid
may not " [r]estrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or
privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or benefit under the
program." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(l)(iv) (1984)). In further support of the Court's use of
the impact standard is the HHS regulation providing that a "recipient, in determining
the types of services. . . which will be provided. . . may not utilize criteria or meth-
19841
Washington University Open Scholarship
304 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 27:295
and in Congress' broad constitutional authority to set the terms on
which it will grant federal funds to the states.5"
In 1978, the Bakke59 decision shed some doubt on the Supreme
Court's seemingly clear preference for the disparate impact standard
expressed in Lau.6" In Bakke, the Court grappled with the question
of whether Title VI forbids a state medical school's purposeful dis-
crimination in the form of an affirmative action program designed to
remedy past discrimination.6 In dictum, five Justices asserted that a
Title VI violation arises only from conduct that would violate the
fourteenth amendment. 62 Thus, some lower courts have reasoned
that Bakke overrules Lau and that Title VI plaintiffs must show dis-
criminatory intent.63
ods of administration which ... have the effect of defeating or substantially impair-
ing accomplishment of the objectives of the program ... " 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)
(1984).
58. 414 U.S. at 568-69. The Court quoted Senator Humphrey's remarks during
floor debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "Simple justice requires that public
funds to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination." 110 CoNG.
REC. 6543 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey quoting from President Kennedy's message to
Congress, June 19, 1963).
59. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60. In Bakke, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice
Powell in the dictum that only conduct forbidden under the fourteenth amendment-
that is, intentional discrimination-is forbidden under Title VI. Id. at 287. In Lau,
however, Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist joined Justice Douglas'
majority opinion finding a violation of Title VI despite the absence of proof of inten-
tional discrimination. 414 U.S. at 569.
61. 438 U.S. at 269-271.
62. Id. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at
352 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The remaining four Justices
did not consider this specific issue, although they concurred with Justice Powell's in-
validation of the university's concededly discriminatory admissions policy. Id. at 417.
Justice Brennan argued that the school's racial quota, as a remedial measure, did not
violate Title VI because "Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that
would violate the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
63. The Second Circuit has displayed considerable confusion over the meaning of
the Bakke dictum. Compare Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 589 (2d Cir.
1978), a.'d sub noma. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979) and Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afd inpart
and vacated in part, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), afd, 463 U.S. 82 (1983), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983) with Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980)
andParents Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1979). Compare Bryan v.
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In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,64  the
Supreme Court did not firmly resolve the intent versus impact issue.
Guardians, however, demonstrates that Lau and the Bakke dictum
are consistent to the extent that they both uphold the remedial objec-
tive of Title VI.65 Two basic propositions emerge from the six differ-
ent opinions authored in Guardians, addressing the constitutionality
of police officer lay-offs based on seniority. First, plaintiffs asserting
a violation of Title VI and its implementing regulations need not
prove discriminatory intent. 66 Second, victims of Title VI discrimi-
nation cannot recover compensatory damages without establishing
discriminatory intent. 67 Considering that Guardians is a fractional-
ized plurality opinion and that it does not directly address the possi-
bility of awarding injunctive relief for Title VI discriminatory impact
victims, it is unclear whether Guardians lends much support to plain-
tiffs in hospital closure suits.
Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 230-32, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) with Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d
612 (2d Cir. 1980).
64. 463 U.S. 82 (1983). For a discussion of Guardians, see Comment, Confusion
Surrounding Title VI and the Discriminator, Intent Requirment: Guardians Associa-
tion v. Civil Service Commission, 27 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 391 (1984).
65. Id See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 479 (1980) (discussing with
approval the Lau holding and noting that HHS regulations aimed at eradicating dis-
parate impacts are a constitutional exercise of Congress' spending power). Signifi-
cantly, Justices White and Powell, who contended in Bakke that Title VI mandates a
discriminatory intent standard, joined in the Klutznick majority.
66. In Guardians, the Second Circuit had reversed the district court's award of
relief under Title VI for lack of proof of discriminatory intent. Justice White, writing
for the Court, affirmed the denial of compensatory relief, but disagreed with the Sec-
ond Circuit's reading of Bakke as extending the reach of Title VI to intentional dis-
crimination in affirmative action programs. 463 U.S. at 83-96. Justice Marshall, in
his dissent from the judgment that denies relief, agreed with Justice White regarding
the discriminatory impact standard. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun re-
jected Justice White's and Justice Marshall's impact standard, maintaining that
Bakke does overrule Lau on this point. Nevertheless, these three Justices would
award compensatory relief because Title VI federal regulations prohibit the use of
federal funds in programs having discriminatory effects. Id. at 110-116.
67. Justices White and Rehnquist rejected the appropriateness of make-whole
remedies, preferring the notion that recipients of federal funds must choose between
complying and receiving funds versus not complying and losing funds. Id. at 88-96.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the end result of no compensation and would require
proof of intentional discrimination. Id. at 98-100. Justices Powell and Burger joined
with Justice O'Connor, but would not allow a private cause of action under Title VI.
Id. at 96-98.
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4. Actual Disposition of Title VI Challenges to Hospital
Relocations and Closures
When courts proceed on the assumption that plaintiffs need show
only a disparate impact to establish a prima facie case for a Title VI
violation, defendants may then attempt to avoid liability for their al-
legedly illegal conduct with proof of justifying circumstances. 68 In
hospital closure cases, hospital administrators or city officals consist-
ently offer "fiscal necessity" in defense of their decisions to abandon
urban locations.69 Courts are reluctant to become entangled in the
political and financial complexities of municipal fiscal allocation and,
therefore, generally do not require exhaustive evidence that relocat-
ing health services is truly the course of last resort.7 °
In NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,7 the plaintiffs
brought a class action suit challenging the medical center's plan to
68. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979) (educational ne-
cessity may be a defense to an action brought under the Emergency School Aid Act);
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977) (determining Title VIII violations through a balancing test for evaluat-
ing discriminatory effects), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); cf. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (no liability under Title VII if practices are justi-
fied by business necessity).
69. See, e.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 315-
16 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). The district court required
defendants to show that the relocation plan would "in theory and in practice serve a
legitimate bona fide interest [of the Medical Center] and [the Medical Center] must
show that no alternative course of action could be adopted that would enable that
interest to be served with a lesser discriminatory impact." Id. (adopting the Third
Circuit's formulation of this test in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149
(3d Cir. 1977), cert deniedsub nom. Whitman Area Improvement Council v. Resident
Advisory Bd., 435 U.S. 908 (1978)). In Wilmington 111, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals accepted financial constraints as a "legitimate bona fide interest of the medi-
cal center." 599 F.2d at 1247.
70. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that
defendant city need not assess all alternatives to hospital closure in the context of total
municipal financing; the city need only make an adequate inquiry into which hospital
it can close and still afford to provide public health care). See generally Note, Main-
taining Health Care, supra note 4, at 302 (arguing that even when financial necessity
compels hospital relocation, Title VI mandates every effort to maintain health care at
the original site).
71. Wilmington 1, 426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977) (action stayed pending HHS
investigation and report), aft'd, 584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1978); NAACP v. Wilmington
Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Wilmington
I/] (affirming HHS's findings as not arbitrary or capricious), vacated and remanded,
599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs entitled to de novo review), on remand, Wil-
mington 111, 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980), a f'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
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replace two city hospitals with a new suburban facility.7" The Dela-
ware federal district court refused to recognize a private right of ac-
tion under Title VI and ordered the Secretary of HHS to investigate
the charge of discriminatory impact." Although HHS found that the
plan would have a disparate impact on racial minorities and the
handicapped, 4 the district court ruled that the impact was not great
enough to merit injunctive relief.75 The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.76 HHS subsequently interpreted its own regulations
to require that federally assisted hospitals mitigate the adverse affects
of relocation.77
In Bryan v. Koch,78 the plaintiffs challenged the city's contemplated
closure of one of thirteen inner-city public hospitals.7 9 The New
72. Wilmington 1, 426 F. Supp. at 922. The plan contemplated construction of a
new $60 million, 800 bed tertiary care facility in a suburban area eight miles from the
city. The plaintiffs feared that although the Medical Center planned to renovate one
out of the three urban hospitals, the new suburban facility would drain too many
resources from the urban hospital. Id at 922.
73. Id. at 924 n.8 (noting that site determination having discriminatory effects is
..specifically proscribed by the secretary's regulations" in 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3)
(1984)). See also supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text for exhaustion of remedies
discussion.
74. See Letter of Findings Concerning Wilmington Medical Center's Plan
Omega, from Dewey Dodds, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Region IV, Dep't of
Health, Education, and Welfare to James A. Harding President, Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc. (July 5, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Findings] (stressing the in-
convenience of travel to the suburban facility as well as the unaffordability and un-
availability of public or private transportation). See also Wilmington II, 453 F. Supp.
at 312.
75. Wilmington I. 453 F. Supp, at 341.
76. Wilmington I1, 599 F.2d at 1247.
77. See Letter of Findings, supra note 74. More specifically, the medical center's
ilmportant non-race related goals were 1) to meet the need for suburban hospital
beds; 2) to capture part of the revenues going to other suburban hospitals; 3) to re-
spond to economies of scale." Id. at 20-21.
HHS and the Medical Center entered into convenants designed to mitigate the dis-
parate racial impact. Wilmington II, 453 F. Supp. at 292. This spawned more litiga-
tion. Id at 310-30 (district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that mitigating
assurances were insufficient and invalid); Wilmington III, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir.
1979) (remanding case for trial de novo on the merits notwithstanding the administra-
tive investigation); 491 F. Supp. at 318 (D. Del. 1980) (district court ruled for plain-
tiffs).
Despite the increase in costs resulting from the five-year delay of litigation, the
Medical Center intends to proceed with construction. See Rose, supra note 23, at 104.
78. 494 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afl'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
79. Id at 215-16. The hospital in question, Sydenham Hospital, is located in Har-
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York federal district court required the plaintiffs to establish that dis-
criminatory intent motivated the hospital's closure.8" Finding no
proof of racial animus, the court ruled that the fiscal necessity of clos-
ing the hospital justified any shortcoming in the plan.8" The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals82 agreed that the hospital's closure would
have a disproportionately adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics. 3
The court noted, however, that this hospital constituted the smallest
and oldest facility in the city's hospital system. Moreover, Harlem
residents could obtain alternative emergency care at another public
facility.8 4
In ruling that the city's alleged financial constraints adequately jus-
tified closure, the Bryan court declined to examine the city's general
approach to fiscal management.85 The dissenting judge asserted that
the city offered no evidence of rational decision-making.8 6 Although
he agreed that fund allocations for public programs are essentially
legislative decisions, the dissenting judge contended that courts
should require cities to evaluate health care alternatives with more
attention to social impact than to financial feasibility.87
lem. New York City's public hospital system constituted over 10% of the city's entire
expense budget for fiscal year 1980-about $1.2 billion. Id.
80. Id. at 236. The court characterized this case as a "dilatory tactic to prevent a
painful but purely political decision." Id at 217.
81. Id. at 223, 237-38.
82. Bryan, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 617 (98% of Sydenham's patients belonged to racial minorities, while
66% of the patients served by the entire municipal system were members of racial
minority groups).
84. Id. at 617-18. The court declared that saving money per se could not justify
the hospital's closure and that the city would have to justify closing this particular
hospital on other grounds. Id. The court based its reasoning on Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the defendants had to show that an employ-
ment test having a disparate racial impact was a useful way to select employees for a
particular job. See id
85. 627 F.2d at 619.
86. Id at 621 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse suggested a two-phase evalu-
ation of the purported justification: 1) examine the process by which the defendant
reaches its chosen course of action and 2) if the defendant followed a rational course,
inquire into the substantive merits of the decision. Judge Kearse criticized the city for
taking an unreasonably narrow view of the range of possible alternatives to closing
the hospital. He also noted that the nearby voluntary hospitals often did not admit
uninsured patients. Id at 624, 626-27 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
87. Id at 628 (Kearse, J., dissenting). See Note, Intent or Impact: Proving Dis-
criminadon Under Title V1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1095, 1109
(1982) (criticizing the majority's failure to clearly enunciate defendant's responsibility
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In United States v. Bexar County,88 low-income minority women
challenged the proposed relocation of maternity services provided by
a county hospital district from a dilapidated inner-city hospital to a
suburban facility eleven miles away.89 The plaintiffs contended that
the district's relocation of maternity services would violate its prom-
ise to maintain obstetric and gynecology facilities in the city in ex-
change for the legislative authority and funds to construct the new
suburban facility.9" The court accepted the hospital district's justifi-
cation that consolidating all services at one site would result in better
overall health care than splitting funds between a inner-city and sub-
urban site.9 The court declined to order a tax increase to finance the
urban facility's maintenance.92
B. Alternative Administrative and Political Resources
In light of the general unwillingness of courts to scrutinize public
fund allocations, other methods for challenging proposed urban hos-
pital closures may be more effective than a constitutional attack.
Also, appropriate relief in a private Title VI action remains unde-
fined. The Supreme Court and most lower courts, however, support
injunctive or declaratory relief.93 In Heath v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
for rebutting plaintiffs prima facie case); Note, Maintaining Health Care, supra note 4,
at 292-302 (arguing that defendant hospitals and cities have a duty to mitigate the
racial impact of financially motivated relocations or closures).
88. 484 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
89. Id at 858.
90. Id
91. Id at 859.
92. Id In closing, the court refused to characterize this litigation as "frivolous" or
'.instituted in bad faith;" rather, it served as a useful ventilation of disagreement and
as a forum for achieving a better understanding of the political and economic issues.
1d. at 861.
93 See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools,
499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
Courts are split over the propriety of awarding damages. Compare Boxall v. Se-
quois Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (damages
not allowed in Title VI suits) and Rendon v. Utah State Dep't of Employment Sec.
Job Serv., 454 F. Supp. 534, 536 (D. Utah 1978) (damages not allowed in Title VI
suits) Kwth Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842, 847 (D. Neb. 1975) (court has
subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VI suit for damages) and Flanagan v. President
& Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1976) (assuming
that damages would be appropriate) and Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536
F 2d 222, 225 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976) (court expressed no view about damages relief). See
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Hospital Authority,94 the plaintiffs used the policies behind the Na-
tional Health Planning Act of 197495 to convince a district court to
enjoin the proposed transfer of inner-city hospital services.96 The
plaintiffs successfully argued that the National Health Planning Act,
which seeks to maintain an even distribution of medical services, re-
quires health facilities to obtain certificates-of-need before relocating
services.97 The defendant hospital authority had failed to obtain a
certificate of need. The court agreed that the transfer would work
irreparable harm upon the plaintiff class in a manner contrary to the
Health Act's objectives.98
Recently, some aggrieved urban residents have achieved greater
success in saving their hospitals by filing complaints with HHS rather
than bringing suit in federal court. 99 In these cases, hospital authori-
ties contemplated leaving inner-city sites despite assurances to HHS
that they would continue to serve the urban needy in return for Hill-
Burton construction funds."°0 By insisting that HHS enforce these
generally Note, supra note 17, at 711-13 (arguing that in hospital cases, injunction is
proper relief because it involves a court "investigation" and it gives hospitals an op-
portunity to comply with HHS regulations before termination of funds; damages, on
the other hand, merely deplete the hospital's already short supply of funds).
94. No. C-C-81-193 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 1981) (order granting injunction), dis-
cussed in Rose, supra note 23, at 105.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 399k (1982).
96. No. C-C-81-193 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 1981) (order granting injunction).
97. HHS regulations authorized by the Act set forth the following requirements
for issuance of a certificate of need:
The need that the population served or to be served has for the services pro-
posed to be offered or expanded, and the extent to which all residents of the area,
and in particular low-income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, women,
handicapped persons, and other underserved groups, and the elderly, are likely
to have access to those services.
In the case of a reduction or elimination of a service, including the relocation
of a facility or a service, the need that the population presently served has for the
service, the extent to which that need will be met adequately by the proposed
relocation or by alternative arrangements, and the effect of the reduction, elimi-
nation, or relocation of the service on the ability of low-income persons, racial
and ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons, and other under-served
groups, and the elderly, to obtain needed health care.
42 C.F.R. § 122.412(a)(3) (1984).
98. No. C-C-81-193 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 1981) (order granting injunction).
99. See, e.g., Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972), cited
in Rose, supra note 23, at 106 n.38 (holding hospitals receiving Medicare are bound to
their Hill-Burton assurances).
100. See, e.g., Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (court in-
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assurances, the plaintiffs prevented hospital closure and, in one case,
even obtained the hospital's agreement to finance major renovations
and new services at the urban facility.'' In addition, in at least one
city, organized social outcry over the threatened loss of an urban hos-
pital has prompted increased political and governmental concern.10 2
III. STATE AND FEDERAL EFFORTS TO INCREASE INDIGENT
ACCESS TO PRIVATELY PROVIDED HEALTH CARE
When neither Title VI challenges nor administrative remedial ef-
forts succeed in maintaining public health care in the city, the urban
poor often are forced to seek charity care at private facilities.0 3 As
the cost of providing health care spirals, °4 private not-for-profit hos-
pitals claim they increasingly are unable to provide services to those
that require them on a less than fully compensated basis. 10 5 As a re-
sult, many private hospitals have adopted the policy of reducing free
or federally reimbursed care to poor people. 10 6
sisted that the plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedy by seeking HHS investigation
of St. Louis' inner-city facility, Homer G. Phillips Hospital), aft'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th
Cir. 1980).
101. See Terry v. Methodist Hosp. of Gary, Case Nos. H-76-373 & H-77-154, par.
5 (N.D. Ind. June 5, 1979) (consent decree).
102. See Mulvanny & Wood, Opposition to Hospital Closings: The Role of ,4ttor-
neys in Coalitions, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1228 (1981). The article discusses the
efforts of citizens, politicians, and attorneys directed against closure of Christian Wel-
fare Hospital in East St. Louis, Illinois. After the coalition convinced HHS to reject
the hospital's application for closure, a group of black doctors, with the coalition's
approval, assumed control of the hospital and presently operate it on a day-to-day
basis. See Rose, supra note 23, at 105.
On the other hand, even when HHS's response seems inadequate, courts may defer
to the agency's perceived expertise. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 8, 97.
104. See, e.g., Gibson & Fisher, National Health Care Expenditures, Fiscal Year
1977, Soc. SECURITY BULL. July 1978, at 5 (Table 1), 15 (Table 5) (Annual national
health care expenditures increased from $69.2 billion in 1970 to $162.6 billion in 1977;
according to the Health Care Financing Administration of HHS, the increase in "out-
lays" is attributed to rapid increases in health care prices, rather than to an increasing
population or general cost of living.). See generally Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform
and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 244 n.4 (1978).
105. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1344(8th Cir. 1980)
(hospital challenging HHS's expansion of free care obligations).
106. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, HEALTH
CARE IN A CONTEXT OF CIVIL RIGHTS 209 (1981) (noting that the reluctance of many
institutions to provide government-sponsored care results in discrimination against
minorities and handicapped as well as other welfare recipients).
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As city governments and private health care providers continue to
claim financial inability to care for the poor, the governmental re-
sponsibility for financing such care passes to the state and federal
levels. 10 7 Congress has enacted two major pieces of legislation in an
attempt to equalize access to health care: the Hill-Burton Act, and
the Medicare and Medicaid statutes.108
A. The Hill-Burton and Subsequent National Health Planning Acts
The Hill-Burton Act of 1946109 constitutes the federal govern-
ment's initial attempt to address urban health care inequities."0
Congress sought to remedy problems such as bed shortages and racist
hospital practices."' Under the Act, Congress has financed construc-
tion and expansion of hospitals that have agreed to provide "reason-
able amounts" of "uncompensated" and "community" services.' 12
Congress focused on urban health care in 1964 when it amnended the
107. See Rosenblatt, supra note 104, at 243, 287 (until 1965, when Medicare and
Medicaid were established, local governments were primarily responsible for provid-
ing government-sponsored health care for the poor).
For an intriguing argument that courts should avoid lodging too much "affirmative
responsibility" upon the government for providing health care, see Blumstein, Ration-
ing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV.
1345, 1362 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources];
Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting Human
Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 231, 233 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives].
108. See infra notes 109-149 and accompanying text.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982).
110. See, e.g., President Truman's Message to Congress on Health Legislation,
1945 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 1143. See also Wing, The Community Service
Obligation ofHill-Burton Health Facilities, 23 B.C.L. REV. 577, 584 n. 32 (1982) (ex-
haustive legislative history). See generally Chapman & Talmadge, Historical and
Political Background of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
334 (1970) (describing federal government's limited role in delivery of medical care
prior to 1946).
111. See Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 291c (1982)).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982). See generally Wing, supra note 110; Rose,
Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act. Realities and
Pit/alls, 7 Nw. U.L. REV. 168 (1975); Rosenblatt, supra note 104; Note, The Hill-Bur-
ton Act, 1946-1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery ofHealth Care to the Poor, 39 MD. L.
REv. 316 (1979); Note, Due Processfor Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities, 32 VAND. L,
REV. 1469 (1979). These commentators differ in their analysis of whether "uncom-
pensated service" and "community service" provide different statutory bases for char-
ity care obligations.
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Act to emphasize modernization and renovation of existing facilities
rather than new construction." 3 Responsibility for regulating and
enforcing the Act's provisions rests with HHS." 4
In 1972, HHS drafted regulations defining the vague "uncompen-
sated care" requirement." 5 Provision of free services equivalent to
either three percent of a hospital's operating costs or ten percent of its
federal assistance under the Act would establish "presumptive com-
pliance." Alternatively, a hospital could certify its intention to adopt
an "open door" policy to all indigents seeking care. 1 6 In Corum v.
Beth Israel Medical Center,1 7 a federal district court ruled that Hill-
Burton hospitals may not include bad debts incurred from otherwise
solvent patients as "uncompensated service.""' 8 Accordingly, HHS
amended its regulations in 1975 to forbid post-care eligibilitydeterminations) 1 9
Other litigation helped to define hospitals' community service obli-
gations. Following a district court's decision in Cook v. Ochsner
Foundation Hospital,"2 ' HHS issued regulations in 1974 mandating
participation in state Medicaid programs by Hill-Burton hospitals.' 2'
The new rules also authorized state agencies to administer and moni-
tor community service assurances.' 22
Although Congress authorized the Secretary of HHS to implement
uncompensated care and community service assurance provisions in
1965, the Department failed to issue any regulations pertaining to
113. See Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3, 78 Stat. 457 (1964) (currently codified at 42
U.S C. § 291j (1982)). See also Wing, supra note 110, at 586-87; S. REP. No. 1274,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2800, 2802-
03
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). Prior to 1966, this responsibility rested with the
Surgeon General. See Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447 (1964).
115. See42 C.F.R. §53.111(d) (1984).
116. Id. These regulations also incorporate the Act's exception to the obligation
to provide uncompensated care if it is "not feasible from a financial viewpoint." 42
U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982). But see Rose, supra note 112, at 170 (noting that no grantee
ever has been permitted to waive the obligation).
117. 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
118. Id at 557.
119. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(0(1) (1984).
120. 61 F.RD. 354 (E.D. La. 1972). The court declared that exclusion of persons
covered by Medicaid constituted a violation of the "community service" obligation.
Id at 361.
121. 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(d)(2) (1984).
122. Id § 53.113(f) (1984).
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these provisions until 1972.12 Even after HHS issued the regula-
tions, however, specific enforcement power rested with the state agen-
cies.' 4 This reduced HHS's role to ensuring that state health plans
reflect Hill-Burton hospital assurances. Consequently, HHS enforce-
ment efforts remained lax.' 25
In 1974, Congress enacted Title XVI of the Public Health Services
Act to provide stricter enforcement of hospital assurances.' 2 6 Title
XVI was introduced to replace the Hill-Burton Act as a source of
funds to hospitals.127 In 1980, the American Hospital Association
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin 2 8 HHS regulations promulgated in
the wake of Title XVI because they expanded the hospitals' commu-
nity service obligations 2 9 beyond those to which it had originally
"contracted" under Hill-Burton. 30 The Hospital Association was
not awarded the injunction because it failed to prove the likelihood
of success on the merits' 3 ' In partial dissent, however, one Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals judge characterized the new regulations as
"administrative overkill," especially in light of current financial con-
straints facing hospitals.' 32
123. See generally Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp., 640 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1980);
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1337 (7th Cir. 1980).
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. See S. REP. No. 93-1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7842, 7900, cited in Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp., 640 F.2d 30,
32 (7th Cir. 1980).
126. See Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k
(1982)).
127. For an overview of permissible uses of funds, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g(a)(1),
300r(a), & 300r(b) (1982). The most notable change from earlier Hill-Burton priori-
ties is the allowance of federal financial assistance to convert or discontinue the use of
health facilities. See also Wing, supra note 110, at 588 n.54 (labels this approach
"reverse Hill-Burton").
128. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1980).
129. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.503(b), .509(b), .a603(d)(l), .603(d)(2) (1984).
130. 625 F.2d at 1330. See generally Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir.
1972) (relationship between Hil-Burton hospitals and the relevant administrative
agency is contractual in nature).
131. 625 F.2d at 1332-38. The American Hospital Association also failed to show
that the increased obligations would cause its member organizations irreparable
harm. Id
132. Id at 1344 (Pell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Judge
Pell also argued that the court should require HHS to honor the original contractual
terms. Id at 1338-42.
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B. Medicaid and Medicare
1. The Statutory Scheme
As the accessibility and quality of privately provided health care
improved during the Hill-Burton era,' 3 3 neglected public hospitals
became "dumping grounds" for the inner-city poor. 134 Congress en-
acted the Medicare 135 and Medicaid 136 laws with the aim of amelio-
rating this dual system of health care. 137  The Medicare scheme
authorized federal reimbursement to those providing health care to
persons over age sixty-five. 138 Congress hoped this legislation would
motivate hospitals to comply with Title VI nondiscrimination re-
133. By 1974, the federal government had assisted construction and moderniza-
tion projects worth over $14.5 billion through grants and loans totaling over $5 bil-
lion. CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TRENDS AFFECTING THE U.S. HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 91-95 (1976) (commissioned by HHS). See also figures cited in S. REP.
No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-18, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7842-49.
Approximately 40% of the nation's current acute care bed supply has received fi-
nancial assistance through the Hill-Burton program. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIA-
TION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS: 1979 (1980). See also Wing, supra note 110, at 557 n.6;
Wing & Craige, Health Care Regulations: Dilemma of a Partially Developed Public
Policy, 57 N.C.L. REV. 1165, 1169-72 (1979).
134. See HOSPITALS, July 1, 1970, at 54. HOSPITALS is the official publication of
the American Hospital Association.
135. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395 (1982)).
136. Pub. L. No, 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396 (1982)).
137. See, e.g., Blumstein & Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health: Problems, Politics
and Perspectives on Formulating National Health Policy, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
382, 384 (1979) (assessing Medicaid and Medicare as reflections of perceived govern-
mental responsibility to distribute the wealth); 1 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION OF HEALTH MANPOWER 34-36 (Nov. 1967) (noting that the U.S.
has declined in relation to other modern industrial nations in providing adequate
quality health care to its citizens). See generally T. MARMOR & J. MARMOR, POLITICS
OF MEDICARE (1973).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d) (1982) (number of reimbursable hospital care days).
The Act permits the exclusion of numerous services from coverage, such as: 1) Rou-
tine physical checkups; 2) eyeglasses or eye examinations for the purpose of prescrib-
ing, fitting, or changing eyeglasses; 3) hearing aids or examinations;
4) immunizations; 5) custodial care; 6) the care, treatment, filling, removal, or replace-
ment of teeth or structures directly supporting teeth; 7) treatment of flat foot condi-
tions; and 8) personal comfort items. A broad exclusion is provided for expenses for
services "which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member." Id.
§1395y(a)(1).
See generally COMMERCE CLEARING HousE, 1978 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDI-
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quirements. 39 The Medicaid statute encourages states to establish a
reimbursement scheme for providers of health care to the poor. 40
To participate in the grant-in-aid program, a state must comply with
a few federally mandated requirements for the provision of basic
health care.' 4 ' States have wide discretion in determining the nature
and amount of coverage for optional services. 142
Recent and proposed reductions in federal funding,'43 as well as
public pressure on states to trim spending programs, have led to
widespread state Medicaid cutbacks. 144 The Medicaid Act estab-
lishes two groups of needy persons. The first is the "categorically
needy," which includes needy persons with dependent children, the
aged, the blind, and the disabled. 145 The second is the "medically
needy," which encompasses all other persons meeting stated poverty
levels.' 46 Participating states are not required to extend coverage to
CARE EXPLAINED 1 601 (1978); Butler, An Advocate's Guide to the Medicare Program,
8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 831 (1975).
139. See VI UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 118-19 (1974) (hospitals are subject to Title VI, but
covered physicians are not); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEW AND TITLE
VI, A REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION, POLICIES, AND COM-
PLIANCE PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 44 (1974).
140. See42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1982).
141. Id §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(l)-(5) (state must provide five basic services:
in-patient hospital care, out-patient hospital care, laboratory and x-ray services,
skilled nursing home care, and physicians' services).
142. Id. §§ 1396a(10)(A), 1396d(a)(12) (state may opt to exclude coverage of
drugs, dental services, eyeglasses, and hearing aids).
143. See, e.g., PROPOSED FEDERAL 1983 HEALTH CUTS, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
32 (1983) (Reagan Administration proposed reductions in federal spending for Medi-
caid by $2.2 billion and for Medicare by $3.lbillion in fiscal year 1983, among other
cuts in health care programs; reductions in federal funding in fiscal year 1982 totaled
$0.9 billion).
144. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 104, at 294-303 (states responded to public
pressure for health cost-control by reducing Medicaid programs); The Closing and
Divestiture of Public Hospitals." Public Responsibility for Health Care of Indigents, 9
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 174 (1975) (California cutbacks in Medi-Cal increased the
burden on county hospitals). See also MEDICAID BUREAU, HEALTH CARE FINANC-
ING ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEW, DATA ON THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: ELIOI-
BILITY, SERVICES, EXPENDITURES: FISCAL YEAR 1966-77 14-18 (1977); Illinois State
Medical Society, Letter to Members (Mar. 4, 1983) (announcing state's 7.5% across-
the-board fee cut for all health care providers).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1982).
146. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C).
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the medically needy. 147 The federal statute does not limit the states'
ability to exclude various services from Medicaid coverage. Con-
gress' frequent references to the words "amount, scope and duration"
in the statute expressly permit states to exercise considerable discre-
tion in this area.148 The statute, however, does forbid limitations that
fall more heavily on the medically needy than on the categorically
needy. 1
49
2. Constitutional Issues in Challenges to Reduced Service
Coverage
The Supreme Court has deferred to the states' discretionary deter-
minations of which services to include in the optional medically
needy category. In Harris v. McRae, 5° the Court considered whether
a state's denial of Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic and medically
ncecssary abortions established poverty as an unconstitutional barrier
to abortion procurement in light of Roe v. Wade.' In Roe, the
Court declined to outlaw abortion by announcing the constitutionally
protected right of a woman to decide, free from governmental inter-
ference, to terminate her pregnancy. 52 The McRae Court did not
read Roe as creating a right to abort, but as forbidding states from
preventing all legal access to obtaining an abortion.' 53 The Court
concluded that denial of Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic and
medically necessary abortions did not create the plaintiffs obstacle to
obtaining an abortion-her improverished condition.' 54
Futhermore, the Court supported the state's right to choose between
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., id § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (1982).
149. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hogan, 455 U.S. 1013 (1982) (in terms of their ability
to provide for essential medical services, the wealthy and the poor are not similarly
situated).
150. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See Comment, Refusal to Fund Constitutionally Pro-
tected Right Held Valid- Harris v. McRae, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 247 (1981) (discussing
McRae).
151. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. Id. at 120.
153. 448 U.S. at 318. The court explained that a woman has the freedom to make
choices regarding her health, but this does not establish "an entitlement to such funds
as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom." Id
154. Id. at 316. See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (fundamental need,
alone, does not merit provision of abortion to impoverished woman); Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438 (1977) (state may exclude abortion from Medicaid coverage because it is not
a necessity).
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competing demands for limited public funds.' 55
Successful challenges to a state's Medicaid cutback depends on
whether the aggrieved party had a legitimate claim to eliminated
health services.' 56 In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,157 the
Supreme Court characterized health care as a basic necessity of
life.'58 Only compelling state interests can support statutory restric-
tions imposed on access to health services.' 59
A person has a constitutionally protected property interest in
health care, though, only when a source independent of the Constitu-
tion, such as state law, creates an understanding that the property
interest exists. 160 In Rosado v. Wyman,' 6' the Supreme Court deter-
mined that persons statutorily eligible to receive particular state ben-
efits have a property interest that the government can eliminate only
upon compliance with basic due process requirements) 62 In Board
of Regents v. Roth,163 however, the Court restricted due process pro-
tection to entitlements presently enjoyed by a complainant as op-
posed to his or her unilateral expectations.' 64 Thus, states must
afford due process procedures only to established recipients of newly
155. 448 U.S. at 318. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)
(requiring only a "rational basis" for classification limiting receipt of welfare
benefits).
156. See, e.g., McRae, 448 U.S. at 318.
157. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
158. Id at 259. The plaintiff, an asthmatic indigent who had just moved to Ari-
zona, challenged a county ordinance conditioning free health care on a year's
residency.
159. Id. at 259.
160. See, e.g., Davis v. Ball, 640 F.2d 30 (1980) (indigents have enforceable inter-
est in free health care as created by Hill-Burton Act, even though the Act does not
define eligibility of recipients).
161. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
162. Id at 405-06, 420-23.
163. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
164. Id at 577 (holding that a teacher had no legally enforceable claim to re-
employment after expiration of his contract). See also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (no entitlement to parole from
valid sentence unless a statute explicitly grants it); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976) (no entitlement to a hearing to challenge a transfer from one prison to another
because no state law creates the right to remain in a particular prison). But see Moris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation determination does require due
process procedures). Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1973) (distinguished present
enjoyment of a liberty not guaranteed by the constitution such as reputation, from the
constitutional guaranty of freedom which is embodied in parole).
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restricted services. A person not already covered by Medicaid cannot
bring a successful challenge to a state's changes in eligibility require-
ments. 165 As more people become unable to afford private health
insurance; and, as states make eligibility for Medicaid coverage more
difficult for low-income wage earners, more people may require pub-
lic hospital services.'
66
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Traditionally, cities have shouldered the burden of providing free,
albeit inadequate, health care for their indigent residents. Reduced
tax revenues that result from demographic changes make this respon-
sibility increasingly difficult to fulfill. Arguably, city governments
should allocate a greater portion of limited resources to health care
needs and courts should enforce this duty more stringently on Title
VI grounds. As a practical matter, though, courts are reluctant to
scrutinize complex legislative funding decisions. Administrative
remedies based on a less theoretical model may yield more tangible
results, yet insufficient financial resources remain the final insur-
mountable hurdle. Meanwhile, city residents are losing the political
and legal fight to save their public hospitals.
167
Congressional attempts to ameliorate health care inequities have
not succeeded and possibly have led to new inequities. The present
administration proposed to make further reductions in federal fund-
ing to state Medicare and Medicaid programs. 168 Currently, private
health care providers are responding to indigents and persons cov-
ered by Medicare and Medicaid. 169 The administration's pro-compet-
itive scheme' 7° contemplates that market-place incentives, rather
165. See generally Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources, supra note 107, at
1373-75; Note, Welfare, Due Process, and "Brutal Needs." The Requirement of a Prior
Hearing in State-Wide Benefit Reductions, 34 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1981).
166. See, e.g., L. ADAY, R. ANDERSON, & G. FLEMING, HEALTH CARE IN THE
U.S. EQUITABLE FOR WHOM? (1980); K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR
ON POVERTY: A TEN-YEAR APPRAISAL 41 (1978); DAVIS & REYNOLDS, THE IMPACT
OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID ON ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE IN THE ROLE OF
HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR 391-92 (1976).
167. See supra notes 1-102 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1985, at 33, col. 4 (New Medicare system will no
longer pay all doctor-ordered medical costs for the elderly, but will reimburse at fixed
rates; and hospitals that exceed these rates will have to absorb the extra costs.).
169. See supra notes 103-65 and accompanying text.
170. See Proposed Federal 1983 Health Cuts, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 32 (1982).
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than governmental regulations will induce private health care provid-
ers to contain spiraling costs. 7 ' In light of recent developments, it
remains highly unlikely that private health care providers will pro-
vide health care to indigents in an equitable and humane manner.
For indigents to receive the care they rightfully deserve, the federal
government must reverse the current trend by significantly increasing
funding for health care programs.
171. As health care costs become increasingly burdensome, focus on cost contain-
ment has superseded the concern over equal access. See, e.g., Schwartz, We Need to
Ration Medicare, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 13; ASPEN SYSTEMS CORPORATION
HEALTH LAW CENTER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 22 (1974). Again, the question
becomes one of free market incentives versus increased government regulation.
Although many scholars have addressed this issue as a purely economic matter, two
writers in particular have engaged in a provocative weighing of the legal issues under-
lying socio-economic realities of health care provision. James Blumstein has argued,
in essence, that the inequitable distribution of health care is a product of an uneven
income distribution. He feels that the market can achieve its own balance if there is
less interference by third party reimbursers and by government regulation. See
Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources, supra note 107, at 1370. See also Blumstein
& Sloan, Redefning Government's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What
the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981); Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra
note 137, at 385; Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives, supra note 107, at 250.
Rand Rosenblatt, on the other hand, rejects the free market view as a consumer
product approach. He is critical of weak government regulations that have only
shifted greater power to private providers while reinforcing the dual track system.
See generally Rosenblatt, Rationing 'Wormal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issue,
59 TEx. L. REV. 1401 (1981); Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The Decline ofthe
Medicaid Cure, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 643 (1975); Rosenblatt, supra note 104.
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